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Special Comment
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
WITHOUT WORK STOPPAGES?
By ALVIN L. GOLDMAN*
INTRODUCTION
Legal institutions have provided us with numerous spectator
sports. The jury trial and its predecessors, including trial by com-
bat, are obvious examples. In the mid-nineteenth century, argu-
ments before the Supreme Court of the United States occasionally
attracted crowds of spectators and captured the front pages of the
yellow press. In more recent times, proxy fights have been rumored
to provide action for the bookmaking set and televised legislative
investigations have won top-viewer ratings. Among the perennial
spectator sports provided by our legal institutions over the past
half-century or more has been the confrontation of labor and
management across the collective bargaining table.
As with all spectator sports, the main intrigue of collective
bargaining is the perpetual air of suspense. Unlike most other
sports, however, interest in this one is heightened by the fact that
here the participants can shift the rules as well as the play.
Analysts have attempted to remove the sport from the col-
lective bargaining process by devising models to explain its opera-
tion. They strive, thereby, to bring the process within the realm
of science; to substitute predictability for suspense. Some of these
theorists use the old-fashioned descriptive analysis approach.,
Others employ mathematical models,2 game models3 and psycho-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. The author wishes to
express his appreciation to his research assistant, William Wobbekind, who ably
contributed to preparation of the footnotes.
1 E.g., M. RYnER, C. PESMus & S. ConEr, MANAcmAnTr PREPARATIoN FoR
CoLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1966); M. TRoTTA, CoLLEC=IvE BAucaNG 68-87
(1961).
2 E.g., Cheng, Wage Negotiation and Bargaining Power, 21 IND. & LAB. EL.
REv. 163 (1968).
3 E.g., C. STEVENs, STRAITGY AN Comicrvr BAnGAINNG NEGOTAIONS 77
(1963). Cf., Allen, Games Bargaining, 65 YALE L.J. 660 (1956) where the author
proposes an interesting game model as a substitute for negotiation.
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dynamic theories. 4 To date, however, probably to the joy of the
sport's public and the delight of its practitioners, these analysts
have failed in their efforts to transform the collective bargaining
process into a predictable series of transactions. Nevertheless, the
spectators' enjoyment can be heightened, the participants' skills
sharpened and perhaps even the rules of the game improved by
attempts at formal and even informal analysis of how the game of
collective bargaining has been played and why the players make
particular moves. Recognizing that such an attempt remains art,
not science, an exercise at analysis of the collective bargaining
process is undertaken here not with the somberness of traditional
legal scholarship but rather more in the spirit of Monday morn-
ing quarterbacking.
BACKGROUND
An excellent vehicle for examining the collective bargaining
process was the 1967 round of negotiations in the automotive in-
dustry. Phase one, that year, was played between the Ford Motor
Company and the United Automobile Workers Union. The game
ran overtime, ending only after a forty-nine day work stoppage.
The second phase was an engagement between the Chrysler
Corporation and the U.A.W. This was a rather anticlimactic,
relatively uneventful repetition of the Ford confrontation minus
the long work stoppage but with the drama of a settlement an-
nouncement made just hours before the strike deadline. Phase
three was between General Motors Corpration and the U.A.W.
Like phase one, it too ran into overtime, but a work stoppage was
never called. With the announcement of the new G.M. agreement,
union leader Walter Reuther described the successful use of an
experimental bargaining technique. It is at this point that our
story begins.
By the time the U.A.W. joined G.M. at the bargaining table,
on November 27, 1967, the old labor contract had long expired.
However, rather than negotiate under the crisis pressure of an
impending strike deadline or an existing work stoppage, G.M. and
the U.A.W. agreed that no stoppage would take place before early
January. Nevertheless, the parties agreed to set December 14th as
4 E.g., R. WALTON & R. McKmEsm, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY or LABOR
NEGOTiATiONS (1965). See also, C. STmVFNs, supra note 8, at 23.
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a target date for negotiating a new contract and stipulated that
they would treat that target date with the same weight and im-
portance as they would a strike deadline. As naive and artificial as
this technique might appear to be, it worked. With the approach
of the target date, the negotiating pace intensified and agreement
began to take shape. When the target date arrived, the negotiators
went into one of those marathon sessions which has become part
of the folklore of collective bargaining. They emerged some thirty
hours later with the announcement of a settlement. Mr. Reuther,
who is one of labor's most successful negotiators, had praise for the
role played by the artificial target date and indicated that it would
be used more often in the future.5
Despite this claimed success of target date bargaining in the
G.M.-U.A.W. negotiations, students of the collective bargaining
process remained skeptical. It all seemed too simple and too naive.
Could grown men, especially those hard-nosed veterans of the in-
numerable rounds of negotiations and periodic work stoppages
encountered in the automobile industry, actually be persuaded by
an artificial device to act as though they were confronted with a
real crisis? This skepticism was borne out a few months later
when the U.A.W.'s attempt to use target bargaining in negotiating
with American Motors failed to produce any results.6
A careful analysis of the success of target bargaining in the
G.M.-U.A.W. situation, however, quickly reveals that there is
more here than meets the eye. Indeed, the underlying explanation
of the success of the technique in the G.M. situation is quite simple
and not in the least naive. Before exploring that matter, however,
it will aid our understanding to take a brief look at the classic
theory of the function of the work stoppage in collective bargain-
ing and see how target bargaining at G.M. fits within, or without,
that theory.
How COLLECTIVE BARGAINING OPERATES7
The tool of the work stoppage, as bizarre and masochistic as it
5 N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1967, at 88, col. 3.0 On Feb. 18, 1968, the U.A.W. announced that February 29th would be the
target date in its negotiations with American Motors. N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1968,
at 33, col. 4. Agreement was not reached until a month after the target date.
Washington Post, Mar. 16, 1968, at 14, col. 1.
7 See generally, E. BEAL & E. WrcannmSnA, Tim PnAcncE OF COLLECTIVE
BA.nAnnaNr (rev. ed. 1963); SrTEvNs, supra note 3; WALTON & McYErsm, supra
note 4.
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often appears, is almost universally regarded by the experts as
indispensable to true collective bargaining. The weapon is avail-
able to both sides. When invoked by management it is called a
lockout; when invoked by labor, it is a strike. Whoever calls the
stoppage, both sides (and frequently the public too) are expected
to suffer substantial economic injury. The employees, of course,
are expected to suffer from loss of wages. Secondary losses, such as
an automobile repossession by an unpaid creditor or family quar-
rels brought on by the extraordinary presence of the breadwinner
at home, are additional employee burdens resulting from a work
stoppage. On the other hand, a work stoppage deprives manage-
ment of the profits of a going operation and may cause the business
to lose those customers and suppliers who make new contacts
during the hiatus. In addition, management may find it quite ex-
pensive to carry its idle plant, equipment and executive and super-
visory personnel. If the employing unit is economically vital, the
public, too, will suffer from loss of its product or services. Further,
the publiL loses tax revenue and may suffer a drain on welfare
type funds as a result of the stoppage.
Why is so much economic injury tolerated? One answer is
that in the overall picture, the impact of work stoppages is really
not very great. Work stoppages occur in about only five percent
of all contract negotiations.8 The annual percentage of total work-
time lost from work stoppages has rarely gone over one-half of one
percent in the past forty years, and some of those stoppages did not
involve contract negotiations.9
Another reason for tolerating the economic injury caused by
work stoppages is that, as experience has demonstrated, in the vast
8 Although the author has seen the figure cited as three percent, that estimate
is probably a bit too low. There are roughly 140,000 collective bargaining agree-
ments in the United States. Of these, most are for a duration of two or more
years. In an average rerent year, the number of stoppages attributable to col-
lective bargaining has been around 2,400. Therefore, assuming that about 50,000
collective bargaining agreements are negotiated per year, about five percent of
those negotiations will entail work stoppages. See, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATIsTics, DEP'T OF LABOR, 1968 HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS TABLES 180
and 183 (1968); U.S. BURaU OF LABOR STATisTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No.
1425-4, MAJOR COLLECrrVE BARGAnnNG AGREEmENTS 7 (1966); U.S. BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1460, ANALYSIS OF WORK STOP-
PAGES 1964 2, 13 (1965); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATIsncs, Da,"r OF LABOR,
BULL. No. 1596, DmEcTORY OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LABOR UNIONS
iN THE IT NrrED STATES 69 (1967).
0 See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, 1963 HAND-
BOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS TABLE 130 (1968).
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majority of employer-employee settings, the collective bargaining
process is the most dignified and equitable method for groups of
employees to secure a reasonable level of employment benefits.10
Because it is a necessary part or the process, the wcrk stoppage is
accepted as the economic price which we pay for an efficient, yet
equitable, system of wage and benefit adjustment. (Of course in
nations where concern for human dignity and economic justice
have not gone much beyond the stage of oratory, work stoppages
are prohibited by law. The Soviet Union and Spain, for example,
are among those nations outlawing work stoppages.)
The function of the work stoppage, according to the classic
theory of collective bargaining, is to provide both the economic
leverage for the parties to resolve their differences and the crisis
atmosphere needed to assure that they will negotiate with ef-
ficiency and in good faith. More specifically, the work stoppage
provides the parties with a yardstick for measuring, at least in
rough terms, the value of a settlement as compared with the con-
tinuation of the economic crisis. Since the parties have a fair idea
of work stoppage costs, they can weigh them against the probable
costs or gains involved in the terms proposed by the other side.
Part of the negotiating process, accordingly, consists of each party
trying to persuade the other that its cost of continued strife is less
than the other's. The threat or existence of a work stoppage also
provides the parties with a deadline for reaching agreement in
order to avert the costs of the stoppage, thus creating the crisis
atmosphere in whi,:h the negotiators are less likely to waste time
in ritualistic pretensions but instead will seek a formula for
settlement."
The function of the work stoppage in collective bargaining,
then, is much like the function of warfare in international negotia-
tions. It is a crude and brutal device for focusing attention on a
dispute, yet for this very reason, the negotiators are more likely
to seek and find a negotiated settlement because they are impelled
by a mutual desire to avoid such an unsophisticated mode for
making their differences felt as well as known. The threat or
10 See, e.g., the statements of Congressional policy in Section 1 of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).11 C. Smv ENs, -upra note 3, at 45-52; B. WALTON & R. McKnEsm, supra note
4, at 30-34, 57, 232.
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existence of a work stoppage, like war, acts essentially not as the
means for resolving the c3nflict between the parties, but rather as
the mainspring in propelling the negotiation process.
Since no one likes a work stoppage-except, occasionally, com-
petitors of the affected company-why not devise a way to bargain
collectively without the strike or lockout? This, it would appear,
is what the G.M.-U.A.W. target bargaining device attempted to
do. Almost everyone agrees that the goal is a worthy one. The dis-
agreement is over the possibility of achieving it.
COMMON SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROCESS
If a substitute for the work stoppage is to be developed, it will
have to provide the crisis of a deadline and a yardstick for
measuring the worth of alternative courses of action, yet not
burden the parties and the public with economic hardship. The
remedies commonly proposed, however, do not move in this di-
rection.
One device, mediation, aims at improving the commun-
ications between labor and management. Occasionally it also adds
the force of the mediator's personality to the existing pressures.
At best, then, mediation does not supplant the role of the work
stoppage in collective bargaining; it merely supplements it. The
device of the fact-finding panel is much the same as mediation, but
because it is more formal and usually more public, it has psy-
chological attributes which add to its effectiveness in some situa-
tions and detract from it in others.
The third, and probably most frequently mentioned remedy, is
arbitration. At best, arbitration substitutes the indirect social and
economic damage resulting from the arbitrator's sometimes ineptly
drawn settlement formula for the direct damage caused by a work
stoppage. At worst, proposals for greater use of arbitration in
resolving collective bargaining deadlocks can mean the total
abandonment of the bargaining process, substituting the arbi-
trator's judgment for the mutual consent of the parties. If the
parties know in advance that arbitration is imminent, they may
be less likely to compromise during negotiation, fearing that the
arbitrator will use a solution which draws a mean between the
points at which the parties stopped bargaining.
Vol. 57,
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At least one proposal for replacing the work stoppage does
meet the theoretical criteria of an ideal substitute-it is the no-
strike strike. A device of this nature was suggested by Professor
Neal Chamberlain in the early 1950's.12 The Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service refers to the device as the Dunbar Plan
in honor of the use of the no-strike strike by Dunbar Furniture
Company.13 Though thc.re are a number of variations, the basic
concept of the no-strike strike is that both parties submit to a
direct pecuniary loss as a substitute for the direct and indirect
financial burdens of a work stoppage. At the same time, the parties
agree to forego the actual stoppage of work as a collective bargain-
ing weapon. Under this approach, when bargaining begins, each
side agrees that production and employment will be maintained
regardless of the progress or lack thereof in negotiations. However,
either side may invoke the work stoppage substitute arrangement
at any time during negotiations. That substitute arrangement will,
for example, require the employees to donate a predetermined
percentage of their take-home pay to a charity of their choice
while the employer similarly makes a predetermined financial
sacrifice in addition to meeting his full payroll. Such a work stop-
page substitute contains enough mutual injury to impel the parties
to seek its avoidance via good faith collective bargaining. It also
gives the parties a scale for measurement in the calculus of
weighing alternative courses of action. On the other hand, despite
the invocation of this -uork stoppage substitute, the employees
continue to enjoy their job security plus a portion of their employ-
ment benefits, and the employer maintains his going business
operation with all sources of management, supply and distribution
intact. Both sides also save the expense involved in storing eco-
nomic resources preparatory to a work stoppage. The public, too,
benefits greatly from such a plan.
The major drawback to the no-strike strike, however, is the
difficulty encountered in agreeing on the formula for mutual
sacrifice. This formula will vary from plant to plant, and likely
even from year to year. Accordingly, arriving at the formula re-
quires a major negotiating effort in and of itself. If the parties can
12 McCalmont, The Semi-Strike, 15 IND. & LAB. BEL. REv. 191 (1962)
(a discussion of Chamberlain's proposal and similar suggestions).
'
3 Letter to author from William E. Simldn, Director, F.M.C.S., Dec. 14, 1967.
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reach a settlement on the formula for functional equivalency
without resorting to a work stoppage while bargaining over it, the
benefits should be worth the effort.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN T=E AUTO INDUSTRY
Because of its economic prominence and the concentration of
its management, the automobile industry rarely operates in a
manner which is typical of conduct in other sectors of our
economy. Surely one special characteristic of collective bargaining
in the auto industry is the stamp of Walter Reuther's influence.
The almost total unionization of line employees, the prosperity
and general growth pattern of the industry, the relatively high
wage rates, the concentration of work force in large plant units,
the ability of the industry to guide sales trends through sophisti-
cated promotional techniques, and the widely dispersed owner-
ship of the companies, have all exerted important influence on the
shape of the industry's collective bargaining. 14
In the automobile industry, both sides normally approach the
bargaining table from a position of strength. In addition, as in all
large organizations, the control of both the employers and the
union resides largely with the executive personnel, not their
constituents-the shareholders and union members. The power of
the constituents is at best in the nature of a veto. The executive
personnel are reasonably secure in their positions. There is no
potent active opposition party appealing to the interests of the
general membership of either constituent group.' 5 Changes of
dynasty do occur in both camps from time to time, but these are
rare.
Collective bargaining in the automobile industry has in fact
been marked by a higher frequency of work stoppages than nor-
mally encountered in other parts of the economy. The parties have
traditionally engaged in intensive preparations for such stoppages
with the result that the impact upon the participants has been
14 See generally, J. GALiRarrA, TnE NEw INDUSTwAL STATE 265 (1967).15 The prolonged effort by the International Society of Skilled Trades to
organize skilled workers in the auto industry has met with seemingly impregnable
legal barriers plus effective efforts by the U.A.W. to retain the loyalty of its craft
members. See, e.g., General Motors, 120 N.L.R.B. 1215 (1958); TM, Nov. 3,
1967, at 91. For evidence of similar stability in management's ranks see, e.g.,
Thvm, Feb. 16, 1968, at 81 (Semon Knudsen of G.M. goes to Ford as its new
President). See generally, J. GALBBArrr, supra note 14, at 72-97, 149-65.
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substantially cushioned. Ford, for example, entered its 1967 strike
with a one month inventory of new cars and a dealers' parts stock-
pile estimated at $300 million.-6 The U.A.W's war chest was
about $66 million when the strike began . 7 Despite these intensive
preparations and although each company separately negotiates its
collective bargaining agreement, as with most aspects of the in-
dustry, there is a high degree of parallelism in the results. Thus,
once the pattern of bargaining is set in one labor contract, the
contracts of the others tend to closely imitate the first and quickly
fall into line.'8
Of the above characteristics of collective bargaining in the auto
industry, only the frequency of work stoppages is surprising. The
battle over the terms and conditions of employment in this in-
dustry does not involve a life or death struggle for either side. It
is evident that a little more or a little less will still leave the
respective parties quite comfortable and secure. Because there is a
pattern of parallelism, moreover, the industry can generally pass
along to the public the major burden of any changes imposed by
a new contract. This does not mean that the parties face no forces
of restraint. Automation and its resulting impact on job displace-
ment is a very real threat to employees and the combined forces
of foreign competitors and antitrust laws are a cause for manage-
ment concern. Yet one would expect the industry to resolve these
problems, in light of its overall health and power, without re-
sorting to work stoppages.
At least two explanations can be offered for the industry's
unexpected reliance on the work stoppage. One is that it has be-
come a slave to its intensive pre-stoppage preparations. As a re-
sult, the officials on both sides must do something to justify
amassing the enormous amount of assets tied-up in inventories and
strike-funds. Likely, the need to justify such conduct serves as
much to relieve the consciences of the corporate and union ex-
ecutives as it does to satisfy the scrutiny of their constituents. In a
sense, then, the leaders must engage in some work stoppages to
demonstrate the wisdom of their decisions in making these pre-
16 Busnuss WEEK, Oct. 21, 1967, at 44-45.
17 Estimates ranged from $65-67 million. U.S. NEws & WoRLD RP., Oct. 23,
1967, at 82; Id. Sept. 18, 1967, at 36; Busniss WEmx, Sept. 2, 1967, at 86.
18 R. MACDONALD, CoI.LVE BARGuNim iN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 5
(1963).
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stoppage preparations. This proposition invites speculation that
if each side could agree beforehand to reduce the extent of pre-
stoppage preparation, the pressure to justify the cost of such
activities would diminish and in turn the frequency of stoppages
too would be reduced.
Another explanation for the auto industry's continued reliance
on work stoppages is that they have become an important device
through which the leaders on each side demonstrate to their
constituents, and to themselves, that they are not about to sell
out their electorate or fold under the pressures of bargaining. Ac-
cordingly, the work stoppage may serve as a device by which
executive virility is displayed. Under this analysis, because of the
tradition of pattern bargaining, once a serious stoppage has taken
place with respect to any of the major members of the industry,
the need for further stoppages is eliminated. After the first major
stoppage, all can demonstrate that they are skilled, tough, dedi-
cated negotiators by using the strike settlement as a base point for
their own contracts.
Even taking the above view of the role of work stoppages in
auto industry bargaining, in all fairness to the management and
union executives it must be noted that both groups bore personal
financial losses as a result of the forty-nine day strike at Ford in
1967. It is reported that the strike's impact on quarterly earnings
left Ford officials without the usual handsome quarterly bonuses.
Similarly, U.A.W. officials reportedly took a twenty-five percent
salary cut during the term of the strike.19 However, the extent of
these sacrifices is somewhat overshadowed when compared with
the estimated loss of $200 million in wages and at least $2 billion
in gross national product attributed to the 1967 Ford strike.2 0
WAs TARGET BARGAINING REALLY EFFECTIVE AT G.M.?
From the foregoing, one can conclude that the target bargain-
ing technique used by General Motors and the U.A.W. in 1967
19 U.S. Nuws & WORLD REP., Nov. 13, 1967, at 86. The author clearly recalls
reading of the union salary cuts but is unable to locate the source.
20 Ford officials estimated the impact on GNP at $2 billion. BuaRux or
NATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1967 LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 97. Government and
university economists made estimates running as high as $4 billion. NEwSWmu,
Nov. 20, 1967, at 85; N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1967, at 65 col. 4. Of course, it is
impossible to determine how much of that loss was permanent and how much
was absorbed by accelerated activity in early 1968.
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was not a functional substitute for a work stoppage. The work
stoppage in the industry's 1967 bargaining round had already
taken place in the Ford negotiations where the contract pattern
was set. Nevertheless, the correlation between the increased pace
of bargaining and the arrival of the G.M.-U.A.W. target date does
suggest that the target date had some sort of influence on bar-
gaining. But, if so, why did it fail to produce results a few months
later in negotiations with American Motors? A touch of synicism
supplies the answer. The target date set by G.M. and the U.A.W.
was just ten days before Christmas. The executives who were
charged with negotiating responsibilities for both the company
and the union could assure themselves of a Christmas holiday
with their families only by reaching agreement on or about the
target date. Otherwise, in order to prove to all concerned that they
were dedicated, hard-working spokesmen for their respective
positions, the negotiators would have had to engage in at least
some bargaining during Christmas week.
AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL FOR BARGAINING WITHOUT
STOPPAGES
But let us not be too skeptical respecting the value of this
target bargaining experience. With the application of a little
imagination, it may yet provide the insight for revolutionizing
the process of collective bargaining.
Whereas the work stoppage effectively stimulates vigorous,
good faith bargaining because of its impact on the people who are
ultimately affected by the collective bargaining agreement-that is,
the shareholders and union members-target bargaining shifts the
emphasis to the operatives in the collective bargaining process. Is
this not a major break-through? Think of the savings to be gained
by shifting the costs of keeping the machinery of collective
bargaining in motion from the numerous affected parties (share-
holders, workers and public) to that very limited group which
has the responsibility of actually negotiating the terms of agree-
ment.
Let us explore the possibilities of this break-through in our
understanding of collective bargaining. The key to success is to
design a process under which the cost of keeping the bargaining
1969]
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machinery operating is shifted to the negotiators. Such a design
could function as follows. In exchange for adopting a new bargain-
ing procedure, the parties will agree at the outset to forego use of
the work stoppage. Then, at the commencement of negotiations
the negotiators will be flown to a major hotel in the Virgin
Islands. They will be permitted to negotiate for as little as four
hours a day, four days a week. All expenses will be paid by their
principals. If, after two weeks, they have not reached agreement,
they will be flown to New York where they will be lodged at one
of the medium priced hotels, again all expenses paid. At this
point, however, the minimum bargaining schedule is expanded to
an eight hour day and a five day week. If, after two weeks, they do
not reach agreement, they will be taken to Albany, New York.
This time they travel by bus and will be accommodated at a
boarding house. At this point they will be placed on a minimum
negotiating schedule of ten hours a day, six days a week. Finally,
if this does not bring agreement after two weeks, the negotiating
teams will be transferred by train to Buffalo, New York where
they will be placed aboard a cramped, rusty houseboat and set
afloat in the polluted waters of Lake Erie. Provisions will consist
of three cases of peanut butter and twenty gallons of strong coffee.
To top everything off, the negotiators will be required to remain
at the place of last accommodation until the collective bargaining
agreement is ratified.
Can collective bargaining exist without the work stoppage?
Of course it can. All that is needed is a little imigination and a
few adjustments in the rules of the game.
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